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The consequences of the Brexit vote for Britain’s role in the world have been subject to 
much recent speculation. These effects are often portrayed as unintended consequences, 
since foreign affairs issues are not thought to have featured prominently in the 
referendum campaign itself. Yet the marginality of foreign affairs in the campaign is 
belied by the frequency with which both sides referenced the United Kingdom’s (UK) role 
in the world and by the emergence of significant differences in how Britain’s international 
position was framed. True, there was little discussion of specific foreign policy questions 
or institutions, such as the European Union’s (EU) Common Security and Defence Policy, 
but this is perhaps to be expected in a campaign which did not focus prominently on 
institutional details. In fact, discussion of foreign affairs featured prominently in both 
campaigns during the referendum, and the same arguments about the UK’s role in the 
world – and the EU’s place within this – were repeated time and again by both camps. Our 
own analysis of campaign materials from the referendum finds that 37 percent of these 
made mention of foreign affairs, and this does not include mentions of topics closely 
linked to foreign policy, including migration, cooperation in justice and home affairs, and 
EU enlargement. The belief in the marginality of foreign affairs in the Brexit campaign has 
resulted in few systematic efforts to describe the variation in international worldviews 
between the Leave and Remain camps and to theorise how foreign affairs came to matter 
in the campaign. This article therefore offers the first sustained analysis of the role played 
by divergent views of Britain’s place in international order in the referendum campaign.  
We argue that the divergent positions articulated by the Remain and Leave camps 
respectively are best understood as “folk theories” of realism and liberal 
internationalism, since they represent divergence on five dimensions commonly used to 
distinguish these traditions of thought from one another: the role of power, the value of 
multilateral institutions, the determinants of trade, the appropriate scope of moral 
concern, and the importance of Western institutions. First, while realists contend that 
security is guaranteed by material power (and the concomitant threat of force), liberal 
internationalists have emphasised the importance of collective security and 
institutionalisation as mechanisms of overcoming competition under anarchy. Second, 
while realists regard the transfer of authority above the state as potentially misguided, 
since international organizations undermine the state’s freedom of manoeuvre yet 
remain inefficacious, liberal internationalists regard institutionalisation as a means of 
achieving greater security and prosperity. Third, while realists regard successful trade 
policy as a function of a state’s power and influence and promote efforts to exploit new 
markets before others do, liberal internationalists regard trade as best promoted through 
the expansion of the rules-based multilateral trading order. Fourth, while realists regard 
the primary purpose of a country’s foreign policy as being the maximisation of the 
interests of the country’s own citizens, liberal internationalists have tended to emphasise 
the duties of leaders to a broader community of individuals across the globe. Finally, 
while realists view efforts to expand values (whether “Western” or otherwise) as a 
potentially provocative act which fails to take into account the realities of power politics, 
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liberal internationalists have viewed the export of democracy, human rights and free 
markets as both a means of achieving greater security and a moral duty linked to the 
West’s identity. 
Our analysis shows that the Remain campaign echoed key elements of liberal 
international thought in its insistence that the EU guaranteed peace in Europe, produced 
mutually beneficial outcomes for its members, buttressed the international trading 
regime, aided development across the region, and helped support and solidify the West 
more generally. The Leave campaign, in contrast, elaborated a number of quintessentially 
realist concerns in its insistence that only American military power had secured peace in 
Europe, that the EU has compromised the independence of its members, that a more 
flexible trading strategy would pay dividends, that foreign entanglements needed to be 
avoided and were not mandated by external duties, and that Europeanisation had 
provoked Russia and created conditions for conflict in Eastern Europe. Table One 
summarises these distinctions, which are elaborated further in the empirical sections 
below. 





through the EU 
responsible for peace in 
Europe 
American military power 




necessary to regulate 
externalities between 
states 




Trade  The EU facilitates rules-based free trade 
EU rules inhibit global 
trade 
Ethics 
Responsibility to other 
nations and their 
populations 
Duties only to British 
citizens and the national 
interest 
Solidarity 
The EU a core facet of the 
West and integral to its 
defence 
The EU undermines 




Table 1: Key differences in Remain and Leave conceptions of Britain’s role in the world. 
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Our argument proceeds as follows. We begin by examining the scholarly debate on Brexit 
and British foreign policy, illustrating the array of existing (and potential) effects the vote 
has on Britain’s role in the world, as well as the scholarly consensus that many of these 
issues did not feature prominently in the campaign itself. We then discuss the sources on 
which our analysis draws and our methods for analysing these, before outlining a 
theoretical framework based on folk theories of international relations that we argue can 
help us understand how positions on foreign affairs were structured during the 
campaign. Our empirical section then discusses, in turn, the positions on foreign affairs 
proffered by the Remain and Leave camps, respectively, conceptualising these as “folk 
liberalism” and “folk realism”. We conclude by summarising our key findings – that 
divergent views of foreign affairs were indeed a factor in the referendum campaign – 
before outlining a number of implications, including the potentially damaging effects of 
politicisation in the foreign policy domain, and the increased likelihood that the UK will 
seek to define a non-liberal path in its future foreign policy trajectory. 
 
Brexit and British Foreign Policy 
Brexit, we are often told, will have important consequences for Britain’s role in the world. 
Key allies will regard the UK differently and European nations will no longer feel the same 
sense of solidarity they once did with the UK (Adler-Nissen et al. 2017; Hill 2018; Oliver 
2018). Those countries that saw Britain’s EU membership as a way of influencing and 
accessing the continent may downgrade the UK in their priorities (Oliver 2016; Oliver 
2017, 529; Yu 2017, 109). Chief amongst these is the United States, which no longer 
stands to benefit from Britain’s position as the American ”Trojan horse” within the EU 
(Oliver & Williams 2016; Rees 2017). The UK will find it more difficult to plug into 
structures for coordinating EU foreign, security and defence policies after Brexit (Biscop 
2016; Black et al. 2017; Martill & Sus 2018; Whitman 2017; Hadfield 2018; Wright 2017), 
and is likely to prioritise its NATO commitment as a consequence (Dunn & Webber 2016; 
Hofmann 2018; Howorth 2017; Keohane 2018). Meanwhile, with the threat of the UK 
veto diminished, and with the Union’s regional environment more insecure than ever, 
Brexit has motivated several institutional changes on the EU side which aim at increasing 
the Union’s strategic autonomy (Tocci 2018; Sus 2017). 
While much has been said on the foreign policy consequences of Brexit, far less has been 
written about the foreign policy worldviews animating the campaigns themselves. 
Although the Remain campaign made much of the EU’s contribution to continental 
stability and security (Dunn & Webber 2016; Whitman 2016), it is claimed that broader 
questions of the UK’s diplomatic relations scarcely featured in the campaign (Hill 2018, 
183) and that questions of foreign policy were seldom discussed in the months thereafter 
(Dijkstra 2016, 1). Instead, concern about immigration, democracy, and economic 
performance are thought to have more or less decisively shaped the agenda ahead of the 
Brexit vote, combining with a number of more idiosyncratic factors, in order to bring 
4 
 
about the vote to leave (see, for example, Blagden 2017, 5; Clarke et al. 2017; Hill 2018, 
183; Schnapper 2017, 93; Schimmelfennig 2018). 
There has, of course, been a substantial focus on certain aspects of the Brexiter 
worldview, including the affective spatial geographies associated with designs on British 
global trade after Brexit (Siles-Brügge 2019), the role of nostalgic yearning for empire 
(Beaumont 2017, 386; Bell and Vucetic 2019; Dorling and Tomlinson 2019; O’Toole 
2018), and the meaning of Theresa May’s ‘Global Britain’ branding (Daddow 2019). But 
to date there has been little sustained empirical analysis of the role played by foreign 
affairs in the campaign or of the systematic differences between the perspectives of 
Britain’s role in the world adopted by the respective campaigns. The prevailing view is of 
Brexit as the outward manifestation of a series of domestic problems which – while they 
may have important implications for British foreign policy – are at base the product of 
concerns about the EU’s ability to deliver for citizens on a range of social and economic 
issues. The implication is that the foreign policy consequences of Brexit are largely 
unintentional by-products of the decision to withdraw from the Union rather than 
reflections of explicit preferences for a different approach to foreign policy. As a result, 
much of the literature on Brexit and foreign affairs treats the impending loss of Britain’s 
EU membership as the loss of one (albeit important) tool of foreign policymaking which 
will require both sustained effort and an inventive search for alternatives to replicate.  
It is somewhat surprising that the role of foreign affairs in the campaign has been 
portrayed as marginal and subjected to little further scrutiny. Many of the key messages 
from the campaign touched upon Britain’s position in the international order and key 
disagreements between both sides emerged over the relative weighting of Britain’s 
overseas commitments, its duties to non-nationals, how to achieve security, and other 
such questions clearly invoking a “foreign affairs” register. The post-Brexit talk of Global 
Britain, moreover, was highly suggestive of the importance Brexiters afforded the 
question of Britain’s role in the world (Daddow 2019; Hill 2019; House of Commons 
2018). The politics of foreign policy more generally has been undergoing considerable 
change, suggesting that the Brexit vote itself may reflect this. Political divisions are 
increasingly structured by support for, and opposition to, globalisation and economic 
openness, rather than support for redistribution at the domestic level (Azmanova 2011; 
Teney et al. 2014; Zürn & de Wilde 2016, 282-284). New and predominantly populist 
parties across European politics have brought with them their own views of foreign 
affairs (Balfour 2016; Chryssogelos 2016; Dennison & Pardijs 2016), largely aligned 
against the prevailing liberal world order, which has found itself under increasing attack 
from within in recent years (Ikenberry 2018, 8; Colgan & Keohane 2017, 36). The 
recurrent mentions of Britain’s global role in the campaign – coupled with these 
indicators of broader changes in the politics of foreign policy – suggest a more systematic 






Analysing the Referendum Material 
In this article, we examine the role played by divergent conceptions of foreign affairs in 
the referendum campaign itself, drawing upon a qualitative analysis of campaign 
materials deployed by both sides prior to the referendum. We use the collection of 
campaign pamphlets, speeches and posters held by the British Library of Political and 
Economic Science, and collected by individuals from the British Library and the London 
School of Economics during the campaign (for further details on how the collection was 
assembled, see Payne 2017a, 2017b). The comprehensiveness of this collection allows us 
to examine a wealth of materials associated with the major campaigns and to ensure a 
representative set of documents has been obtained for analysis.  
In order to keep the task manageable, we limited our analysis to the main groups on 
either side of the campaign alongside those representing the main political parties. We 
analysed material from the two official campaigns as designated by the Electoral 
Commission (Vote Leave and  Britain Stronger In Europe); organisations which ran 
significant unofficial campaigns (Better Off Out, Campaign for an Independent Britain, 
Grassroots Out, European Movement, Leave.EU); the (Remain-supporting) campaigns of 
the major political parties and their respective leaderships (Labour Party, Liberal 
Democrats, Conservatives In); and the Leave-supporting splinter groups within Labour 
and the Conservatives (Labour Leave and Conservatives for Britain).  
As this list makes clear, the two campaigns featured somewhat distinct organisational 
ecologies – notably a greater number of unofficial pro-Leave organisations, owing in part 
to the fact that the mainstream political parties were heavily pushing the Remain 
campaign. It is for this reason also that distinct splinter groups from these parties 
organised to support the Leave campaign, with the notable exception of the Liberal 
Democrats, the most pro-EU party. We excluded from our analysis a number of smaller 
organisations, including single-issue groups and regional and minor parties. The impact 
of these organisations’ campaigns was marginal compared with the larger groups under 
study. Moreover, reasons of space preclude a more comprehensive description of the 
positions of all the actors involved in the debate. By focusing on larger and better-known 
organisations we capture 62 percent of the materials in the archive. Moreover, our 
selection criteria are not biased towards either of the camps, capturing 63 percent of 
Remain materials and 59 percent of Leave materials, respectively. 
A cursory analysis of the remaining documents, meanwhile, suggests that many of the 
same themes emerge in the excluded materials. In other words, there was not all that 
much diversity when it comes to foreign affairs between the different groups on either 
side. Perhaps the main exception is that of the ‘Lexit’ campaign, a loose affiliation of left-
wing pro-Brexit actors, many of which were more cosmopolitan and internationalist than 
other Leave campaigns (Callinicos 2015), although elements of ‘left nationalism’ and 
Euroscepticism were also discernible in the Lexit campaign (Worth 2017). Lexiteers 
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actively worked to dissociate themselves from the “reactionary anti-EU campaigning of 
UKIP and the Tory right” and instead advocated “a principled, anti-racist and 
internationalist campaign, committed to democracy, social justice and environmental 
sustainability” (Left Leave Campaign 2016). The internationalists in the Lexit campaign 
argued the EU was an aggressive and imperialist entity dedicated to the promotion and 
expansion of neoliberal ideology. The Left Leave Campaign, for instance, claimed “the EU 
is engaged in the mass deportation of refugees from Greece… [and] “Fortress Europe” is 
also developing a military dimension, which EU treaties openly link to NATO” (Left Leave 
Campaign 2016). 
We examined each text for mentions of foreign affairs. Specifically, we looked for mention 
of the following themes: the nature of the international system; Britain’s role in the world; 
mechanisms of British power and influence; the UK-EU security relationship; NATO 
and/or the transatlantic relationship; support or opposition for free trade; relations with 
major global players; membership of international organizations; and international 
threats and adversaries. Because of the risk that everything related to the EU could be 
broadly described as foreign affairs, we excluded from our analysis mentions of 
migration, EU enlargement, intra-EU politics, and judicial and police cooperation. Even 
so, a high proportion of materials examined – 37 per cent – touched upon foreign affairs. 
This breaks down as 35 per cent of Remain materials and 41 per cent of Leave documents. 
The proportion of Leave materials is potentially an under-estimate since we excluded 
those mentions (ten instances) of Britain’s global role where they formed part of an 
organisational tagline. If we include these mentions then the proportion of materials 
mentioning foreign affairs rises to 64 per cent. Focusing on specific organisations and 
foreign affairs mentions gave a corpus of 42 documents upon which to base our analysis. 
In systematising the material in this way and referring to the “Remain” and “Leave” 
campaigns as singular, we do not mean to downplay any variation within and between 
the different groups on either side, but rather to suggest that the differences we highlight 
represent a meaningful overarching distinction – a lowest-common-denominator of the 
overall campaigns’ respective international thought, rather than a detailed analysis of the 
views of each individual group within the campaign. 
As suggested in Table One and elaborated further below, a number of recurring themes 
emerge in the texts that differentiate those mentions of foreign affairs and Britain’s place 
in the world as emphasised by the Leave and Remain campaigns, respectively. Our central 
argument is that these recurring themes are linked together by their basis in common 
folk theories of international politics, namely liberal internationalism for the Remain 
campaign and realism on behalf of the Leave campaign. In the next section we discuss the 
concept of folk theories in more detail before turning in the subsequent sections to the 
empirical analysis. 
 
Folk Theories and Foreign Policy 
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If we accept there are likely to be partisan differences over Britain’s place in the world 
nested within the Brexit debate, then what form should we expect these disagreements 
to take? To understand the different positions and to help specify the dimensions on 
which they differ it is helpful to return to the distinction between realist and liberal views 
of international order. This distinction is both well-established within the discipline and 
salient at the level of public debate (a point we discuss in greater detail below). Broadly 
speaking, realists envision a world defined by material power and competition between 
states, where international anarchy pushes states into balancing power through flexible 
alliance patterns and a trust-no-one attitude (e.g. Jervis 1978; Mearsheimer 2001; Waltz 
1979; Waltz 1993), and in which institutions play only a marginal role in promoting the 
interests and the values of the powerful (Gilpin 1981, Mattli & Büthe 2003; Mearsheimer 
1994; Schweller 2018). Liberals, in contrast, depict a rule-governed environment in 
which like-minded (usually democratic) states are able to abridge anarchy by 
institutionalising their relationship (Axelrod & Keohane 1985; Lake 2007; Nye 2004; 
Slaughter 2009), leading to superior collective outcomes for states and citizens alike 
(Ikenberry 2009, Snidal 1991). These are stylised representations of complex bodies of 
scholarship. But they serve to highlight important differences in international 
worldviews. 
Where the debate between realism and liberalism is still highly pertinent, is in the 
relationship between these analytical categories and the political positions taken by 
actors on questions of foreign affairs. For, while the task of analysing international 
relations has long moved on from such broad, essentialist categories (e.g. Brown 2013; 
Dunne et al. 2013; Wæver 1996) political debates on foreign policy questions continue to 
echo areas of debate between realists and liberals. Kertzer and McGraw (2012) have 
argued, for instance, that public opinion is redolent of a “folk realism”, while several other 
studies have highlighted significant conceptual overlap between, for instance, the 
categories of realism and conservatism (Drezner 2008; Ish-Shalom 2006b; Rathbun 
2008), and progressive/centrist political positions and liberalism (Hofmann 2013, Martill 
2017, 2019, Parsons 2000).  
There are three reasons why we witness significant overlap between IR theoretical 
categories and political positions. The first is that some domestic ideological positions 
imply support for corresponding positions in foreign affairs. Individuals on the left are, 
for instance, held to be more trusting than those on the right, meaning they are also more 
likely to support institutions at the international level which imply a high degree of trust 
that other states will not defect (e.g. Rathbun 2004, 17). The left is also held to be more 
disposed towards egalitarianism and thus towards spending on foreign aid (Gries 2012). 
There is also some suggestion that the left is not as supportive as the right when it comes 
to defence spending (e.g. Nincic 2008), although this must be weighed against evidence 
that the statism of the left allows it to countenance higher levels of public spending more 
generally, including on defence (Gaddis 1982). The second is that IR theories themselves 
have been distilled from pre-existing traditions of thought, with the aim of theorists being 
to – quite self-reflexively – systematise these rather unstructured positions into formal 
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theories (e.g. Moravcsik 1997; Waltz 1979). As processes of systematisation have 
progressed – and as the various research programmes have spurned their own internal 
debates and sub-disciplines – the distance between the initial traditions of thought and 
the research programmes bearing their name have increased, diminishing the perceived 
commonality between the two. As the sociologist Boltanski has argued, against the 
critical-sociological idea of an “epistemic break” between ordinary people’s views and 
theorists’ supposedly more developed sensibilities, theorists should think of their work 
as elaborating ordinary critiques rather than developing independent, “objective” 
conceptions of the world (Boltanski 2009; Lemieux 2014, 155). The third is that concepts 
and theories developed in the academy have the propensity, over time, to filter into public 
consciousness and inform political debate. Although it is often said that little filters out of 
the discipline of IR (Buzan & Little 2001), this is not necessarily the case when it comes 
to some of the broader concepts utilised by IR scholars. Core concepts have traditionally 
been transposed into public discourses by scholar-practitioners, whose simultaneous 
role as public intellectuals and foreign policy practitioners affords them significant 
authority and influence (e.g. Steffek & Holthaus 2018). The Democratic Peace Thesis is 
one such specific example, elements of which were (in)famously employed by both Bill 
Clinton and George W. Bush to justify foreign policies aimed at promoting democracy 
abroad (Ish-Shalom 2006a, 2008). 
We characterise these theoretical propositions held by the public and political 
movements as folk theories, following Kertzer and McGraw (2012) and Adler-Nissen 
(2015, 287). These are not theories in any formal sense, but rather stylised variants. 
There are three key differences between theories and folk theories. First, unlike formal 
theories folk theories are often not labelled – or explicitly identified with – by their 
adherents. The community of thought is not constructed by the analyst, but very often the 
label is. Second, folk theories tend to be less coherent than formal theoretical 
propositions and are not associated with the kind of sub-categorisation which 
distinguishes different categories of realism or liberalism. Third, folk theories are not 
designed to be “tested”, and their adherents subscribe to these positions as matters of 
belief rather than analytic utility. This makes these views much more stable than 
theoretical commitments, which should be subject to continual efforts at falsification (at 
least in a positivist epistemology – as we will discuss below, few theories are so neutral). 
We see folk theories as a collection of openly advocated views of how the world “works”, 
in sum bearing a close resemblance to “real” theories. They are thus distinct from (but 
related to) alternative concepts, such as discourses, which are deeper structures of 
representations that make certain truth claims possible (see Todd 2016 for a discourse 
analysis of British debates on Europe published pre-referendum), or narratives, which 
tell particular stories about selves and others that, like discourses, constrain and enable 
action and even thought. In opting for the term folk theory, we also want to explicitly 
highlight the close link between theoretical constructs and political views and debates. 
The correspondence between political positions and mainstream IR theories is an 
important fact of the politics of foreign policy in many countries and one with important 
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implications both for how we treat theoretical categories and study foreign policy 
positions. The first implication is that these theories themselves cannot contain 
immutable truths, but will always remain a partial, ideological representation of the 
world. This is both because they are linked to pre-existing ideologies (Jahn 1999, 2009; 
Rathbun 2009), and because any explanation of world politics would need to take into 
account how these rival theoretical traditions played out (Schindler 2014). The second 
implication is that, once the status of mainstream theoretical traditions is appropriately 
contextualised, these theories can prove highly useful for understanding the structuring 
of political positions on international issues, since they contain within themselves several 
(linked) claims deployed by political actors (e.g. Hayes & James 2014). Thus, the folk 
versions of realism and liberal internationalism can offer helpful guides to how the 
Remain and Leave camps conceptualised Britain’s role in the world. In the next two 
sections we discuss these positions in greater detail, elaborating on the summary in Table 
One. 
 
Folk Liberalism and the Remain Campaign 
The dominant message of the Remain campaign echoed Prime Minister David Cameron’s 
claim that the UK would be “stronger, safer and better off” inside the EU, while 
highlighting the corresponding risks and uncertainties of leaving. Indeed, much of the 
literature repeated this phrase verbatim, portraying the vote as a “once in a generation 
opportunity to choose a Britain that is stronger, safer and better off” (Britain Stronger in 
Europe 2016c). Widely dubbed “Project Fear” by its opponents, both the Labour and 
Conservative campaigns for Britain to remain emphasised the instrumental value of the 
UK’s membership of the EU, claiming it would be good for jobs, the economy, security, the 
NHS, and Britain’s role in the world. In one of his defences of Britain’s EU membership, 
Cameron argued that, within the EU “we’ll be stronger in the world, being able to get 
things done …we’ll be safer in the EU because we’ll be able to work with our partners. 
Strength in numbers in a dangerous world” (BBC News 2016). These arguments linking 
British influence with its EU membership were representative of a folk liberalism. The 
Remain campaign’s representation of the EU particularly emphasised its contribution to 
the security of the European continent, its provision of collectively beneficial outcomes 
for its members, its facilitation of trade and economic linkages, its contribution to 
development, and its deterrence of illiberal adversaries. We discuss each of these in 
greater detail below. 
First, the campaign portrayed the EU – and the institutionalisation it represented – as the 
cornerstone of peace in Europe since 1945, in line with the EU’s own “noble narrative” 
(Manners 2010; Manners & Murray 2016). If we left the EU, the Stronger In campaign 
noted, “we would be going backwards, not forwards in what we set out to cure after the 
terrible tragedies of the Second World War” (Britain Stronger in Europe 2016e). 
Cameron, in a speech in May 2016, argued that the EU “amplified” British capabilities and 
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influence and helped foster peace on a previously war-prone and divided continent 
(Dunn & Webber 2016, 471-472). The Labour and Liberal Democrat campaigns material 
made similar points. “Two world wars in the first half of the 20th Century are a stark 
reminder of Europe’s past” proclaimed a Labour leaflet, continuing: “After 1945 good 
people…across Europe came together to prevent this from ever happening again” 
(Labour In for Britain 2016c). The Liberal Democrats represented the EU as “an 
incredibly important pillar of our security and the greatest peacetime experience the 
world has known”, continuing: “voluntarily leaving this family of nations would put our 
national security at risk” (Derin Adebiyi cf. Haringey Liberal Democrats 2016). The 
emphasis on the strategic aspect of European reconstruction was also present in regional 
literature, such as that published by local remain campaigners in Cambridge, which 
argued: “Each generation from the fall of the Roman Empire until 1944 slaughtered each 
other on the battlefields of Europe … Remaining within the EU and promoting our joint 
goals is the best way to ensure that such destruction will not happen again” (Cambridge 
for Europe 2016). The European Movement put it more emphatically, noting: “The 
countries of the European Union have enjoyed an unprecedented 71 years without a war 
– a whole life-time. The EU and NATO work together to keep the peace for us … No two 
members of the European Union have ever been to war. The same cannot be said for 
NATO [since] 1974 saw Turkey invade Cyprus” (European Movement 2016). This directly 
echoes liberal IR theory’s concern with institutional co-operation to avoid wars under the 
condition of anarchy. 
Second, the campaign highlighted the supposed ‘multiplier’ effect of British EU 
membership, whereby having a seat at the table and coordinating with other member 
states allows the UK greater influence and clout internationally. Underlying this position 
was a distinctly positive view of the role played by supranational institutions in 
delivering positive-sum outcomes for their members. “If we leave the EU”, one Stronger 
In leaflet claimed, “we’ll lose our seat at the top table – and risk our influence in the world” 
(Nigel Sheinwald, cf. Britain Stronger in Europe 2016f). Other arguments echoed 
Slaughter’s (2009) emphasis on “network” power by explicitly referring to the power 
potential inherent in the UK’s position within multiple institutions. The European 
Movement, for example, claimed that: “Britain is a member of more international 
organisations than any other country. We sit at all the top tables; UN, NATO, EU, 
Commonwealth, G8, IMF, World Bank, etc., and we are able to use our unique network to 
influence the course of world events” (European Movement 2016, 11). The Labour 
campaign echoed these same points (e.g. Labour In for Britain 2016b, 2016d). One 
pamphlet claimed that “Britain’s influence as a world power is strongest as part of the 
European Union [since] we negotiate better deals that keep prices down and help British 
businesses sell their products” (Labour In for Britain 2016d). 
Third, the Remain campaign argued that the EU was key to facilitating the UK’s trading 
relationship both within Europe and the wider world. “While the EU is our biggest trading 
partner”, began a Stronger In pamphlet, “being in Europe also means we benefit from free 
trade deals the EU has signed with over 50 countries around the world” (Britain Stronger 
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in Europe 2016d). The same text also highlighted a headline from The Guardian 
newspaper, which read: “US warns Britain: It you leave EU you face barriers to trading 
with America” (Britain Stronger in Europe 2016d). Interestingly, the Labour In for Britain 
(2016a) campaign also emphasised the EU’s importance as a facilitator for trade deals, 
linking this to the increased influence afforded the UK through its membership, claiming 
that “being in Europe helps make Britain a more powerful country … helps us to negotiate 
better deals with countries like the USA and China… [and] makes us a major player in 
world trade”. However, it must be noted that Labour’s remain campaign was led, 
principally, by the party’s centre-right, and the emphasis on global free trade and “deal-
making” was opposed by a significant portion of the party, including its leader, Jeremy 
Corbyn. In place of the Leave campaign’s promise of striking trade deals through new 
bilateral relationships, and its representation of the EU as a barrier to external commerce, 
then, the Remain campaign assumed a liberal-aligned position and highlighted the EU as 
a facilitator of global trade through its rules-based system, warning of the risks of British 
withdrawal. 
A fourth element in Remain’s folk liberalism was an emphasis on solidarity vis-à-vis other 
EU member states and a less exclusive conception of the national interest. While at times 
this jarred with the predominantly instrumental tone of the campaign, references to 
other countries emphasised the duties owed to them by Britain, and painted them in 
friendly terms. The Liberal Democrat campaign, for instance, quoted one representative 
as saying: “I’m in because I believe the kind of caring, confident and ambitious Britain we 
all want to live in ought to lead the European Union through the challenges of the 21st 
Century and not abandon our friends and neighbours when they need us most” (Guy 
Russo cf. Haringey Liberal Democrats 2016). The European Movement also represented 
voting remain as “a choice to continue to play a leading role, working with our friends 
and Allies in our ambition to build an even more peaceful and prosperous future” 
(European Movement 2016). Perhaps most important in this regard is the absence of 
mentions of British taxpayers’ money being spent on projects overseas. When speaking 
of other member states, the Remain campaign tended to use phrases such as “European 
friends and allies” (Britain Stronger in Europe 2016h) and to portray European 
development assistance positively (e.g. European Movement 2016, 7). 
Fifth, the Remain campaign defended the EU because of its perceived contribution to 
Western defence. What is specifically liberal about this claim is the value ascribed to the 
democratic and free-market institutions of “the West” and the contribution made by the 
EU itself to solidifying this collective identity. Although frequently subsumed under the 
broader claim that Britain was “more secure” within the EU, it was clear in many 
instances that this referred to the EU’s contribution to the collective defence of Western 
interests, always conceived of in relation to an anti-democratic, illiberal other. As one 
Britain Stronger in Europe (2016b) pamphlet put it, “Brexit would leave Britain 
vulnerable to threats of Isil and Russia”. The government’s official intervention made a 
similar point, noting that “EU action helped prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons 
… EU membership brings economic security, peace and stability” (HM Government 2016). 
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On their website, the Stronger In campaign argued that: “You and your family are safer in 
the EU. Many of the threats to Britain's security are global in nature, like terrorism, 
Russian aggression and cross-border crime and EU cooperation allows us to fight them 
more effectively. There is strength in numbers – as part of the EU we are able to 
implement sanctions against Russia” (Britain Stronger in Europe 2016g). 
 
Folk Realism and the Leave Campaign 
Supporters of the Leave campaign sought to portray an image of diminished British 
power in consequence of its EU membership. Prominent in this discussion was the 
historical memory of Britain as a global, imperial power. As Anthony Barnett put it: 
“Brexit is an act of British nationalism. It is a claim that Britain can and should be a global 
force on its own, and that the participation of Britain in Europe is a form of subordination 
to a European empire” (Barnett 2017). Below, we identify five folk realist messages of the 
Leave campaign that contrast to the liberal messages of the Remain campaign: the 
emphasis on the role of American material power in guaranteeing European security, the 
need to maintain national freedom of manoeuvre, the benefits of a neo-mercantilist trade 
policy, the importance of avoiding entanglements and absence of duties to non-citizens, 
and the dangers of Europeanisation for provoking Russia. 
The first key element of this folk realism was the claim that the EU’s contribution to 
European security was overrated. It was a common refrain of the Leave campaign that 
the United States, through NATO, offered by far the greatest contribution to post-war 
European security, and that the establishment of the EEC/EU had been a distraction. The 
Vote Leave campaign argued that NATO was “the single key component in Britain – and 
Europe’s – security” and the EU an irritant that risked “undermining NATO” (Dunn & 
Webber 2016, 472). One leaflet exposed the “myth” that “Since WWII the EU has helped 
keep peace in Europe”, arguing instead that “NATO deserves the credit for maintaining 
peace in Europe since 1949” (Read 2016). This echoed comments by UKIP leader Nigel 
Farage in the years preceding the referendum to the effect that the EU’s contribution to 
post-war security had been minimal and that EU membership risked harming the UK’s 
“special relationship” with the US and the Atlantic alliance (Maguire 2015). Julian Brazier, 
the Conservative MP for Canterbury, argued that the US and NATO were exclusively 
responsible for the post-1945 “zone of peace”, and that the necessary alternative to EU 
membership was “to re-join the rest of the World, keeping our influential places in the 
proven institutions of NATO, the UN and the Commonwealth... Britain can have a great 
future, if we take charge of our own destiny, resting in secure alliances and continuing to 
rebuild our global trade” (Brazier 2016). Lying beneath this take on the sources of peace 
is a realist belief that international order is grounded in material power, not institutions, 
and that while multilateral military alliances like NATO are beneficial because they 
enhance collective material power without (in theory) undermining sovereignty, the 
pooling and therefore diminishing of sovereignty represented by the EU is not. While the 
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Leave campaign’s acceptance of American military power as a security guarantee cannot 
be exclusively conceived of in realist terms – the “special relationship” is nothing if not 
based on identity, culture, linguistic affinity, etc. (see e.g. Haugevik 2018) – it is important 
that (at least in the British conception) this is seen as a relationship among sovereign 
equals rather than the “subjugation” often referred to in relation to the EU (O’Toole 
2018). 
Relatedly, a second element of the folk realism was the promotion of independence from 
supranational authority (the EU) and, in consequence, the adoption of a more flexible and 
“free” foreign policy. One element of the concern for independence was democratic. A 
Vote Leave (2016d) document noted that if “we vote to remain, EU laws will overrule UK 
laws and the European Courts will be in control of our trade, our borders, and big 
decisions like whether prisoners are allowed to vote”, while Leave.EU (2016a) claimed 
that “65% of Britain’s laws are influenced by the EU. By leaving the EU, the accountability 
of our laws and leaders will dramatically improve”. The various leave campaigns echoed 
many of these sentiments in their material. The Conservative campaign claimed “Britain 
needs fundamental change so that we can control our borders, trade freely around the 
world and return power to Parliament to block harmful EU rules” (Conservatives for 
Britain 2016). One UKIP leaflet, titled “Who Governs Britain?”, complained that: “most of 
our laws are now made by the European Union, not by our own Parliament and 
Government in Westminster…almost all areas of our domestic policy are now controlled 
by the EU”. It concluded by arguing that the “EU is destroying Britain as an independent, 
democratic nation…do not waste this opportunity…to get our country out of the EU 
before we are absorbed into an undemocratic United States of Europe” (UKIP 2016b). 
Another element of the Leave critique of supranational authority was its inefficacious 
nature. There was distrust in the idea that the regulation of international order requires 
institutions. The businessman and prominent Leave advocate Tim Martin, for instance, 
made this point in relation to both trade and security. “It cannot be seriously suggested 
that the French, Germans and others will wish to cease trading with us or will be able to 
afford to”, he claimed, continuing that “the UK could completely disarm…and we would 
be under no danger from our German or French friends” (Martin 2016, 3). 
A third element of realism in the Leave campaign was provided by the emphasis on a neo-
mercantilist trading order in which flexible patterns of trade and the search for new 
markets among “old friends” supplanted the emphasis on an institutionalised, rules-
based trading order favoured by Remain supporters. From this perspective the EU’s 
system was seen as a hindrance to trade and engagement with wider global markets. 
Grassroots Out leaflets argued that leaving the EU would “allow British businesses to 
trade freely across the world” (Grassroots Out 2016), while the right-wing Bruges Group 
argued Brexit offered the opportunity for “global trading [and] better opportunities to 
open up global markets” (Bruges Group 2016b). Leave.EU claimed that: “The EU takes the 
UK’s place in many global bodies and overrules Britain in most of the others…Once freed 
from the EU’s gagging order, Britain will be able to capitalise on its enormous cultural, 
political, economic, scientific and business clout in global affairs” (Leave.EU 2016b). The 
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link between free trade and a Britain engaged with the “wider world” was referenced in 
a number of campaigns. The slogan of the Better off Out campaign, for instance, read: “NO 
to the European Union, YES to the wider world” (Better off Out 2016a) while their leaflet 
claimed it was “presenting the positive case for Britain to be a free nation in a free world” 
(Better off Out 2016b). The Campaign for an Independent Britain (2015) argued, 
meanwhile, that “the UK does not need to be a member of the ‘inner core’ of the EU. If we 
leave we shall take our proper place at the top global tables”. A Vote Leave (2016c) flyer, 
meanwhile, bemoaned that, in the EU “the UK can’t make trade deals on our own. This 
means we currently have no trade deals with key allies such as Australia, New Zealand or 
the USA – or important growing economies like India, China or Brazil”.  
A fourth aspect in the Brexiter folk realism was the emphasis on putting British citizens 
first and a more restrictive scope of moral concern which regarded the duties of the UK 
government as existing within the boundaries of the British “nation”. As one Grassroots 
Out leaflet complained: “How about we take care of our own problems first, and leave EU 
[sic]” (Grassroots Out 2016). Indicative of a similar concern with funds from UK taxpayers 
being spent abroad, Vote Leave sent leaflets to households opining that “there are 35 
million potholes in Britain. But your money is being spent on bridges like this in Greece” 
(Vote Leave 2016b), and famously re-liveried a bus to carry the message: “We send the 
EU £350 million a week let’s fund our NHS instead” (The Independent 2017). The concern 
was not just about the UK’s status as a net contributor to EU budgets, but rather reflected 
a deeper notion of social justice and expenditure on public services as being something 
that should take place only within the boundaries of the community. Frequent mention 
was also made in the campaign to the risk of entanglement in the problems of others 
through EU membership, especially vis-à-vis the Middle East and Europe. This was the 
case in the infamous Vote Leave (2016a) flyer showing Turkey in red as an EU candidate 
country with its neighbours Syria and Iraq shaded pink (no other neighbouring countries 
were highlighted). Aside from the dog-whistle racism represented by this image, the 
broader point encapsulates a realist concern with avoiding foreign entanglements and 
problems that are not “ours”. 
A fifth folk realist element was the claim that the EU – and its expansion – had contributed 
to insecurity in Europe through militarism and provocation. While the opposition to 
militarism may initially appear antithetical to realism, the critique levelled at the EU’s 
supposed belligerence is based on pragmatist grounds, the argument being that Western 
efforts to expand democracy and liberalism eastwards unnecessarily provoked Russia 
(see Mearsheimer 2014 for a realist scholar’s exposition of a similar argument). A 
pamphlet from the Bruges Group went into detail on this point: “The hostility towards 
the EU’s near abroad we see today continues the EU’s ever wider expansion – and they 
always like an external enemy to force an internal unity…A new cold-war conflict is the 
opposite of peace and security for Britain. We do not want the EU bringing that 
back…Peaceful progress is a better way forward than growing EU belligerence” (Bruges 
Group 2016a). UKIP campaign material also noted that the EU “failed in Yugoslavia [and] 
provoked a war in Ukraine” (UKIP 2016a), and Nigel Farage has frequently criticised EU 
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(and NATO) enlargement as a provocation. In his April 2014 televised debate with Deputy 
Prime Minister Nick Clegg on Europe, Farage argued the EU possessed “an expansionist 
foreign policy, with the aim to militarise as quickly as they can”, claiming the EU and 
leading mainstream politicians had “all been saying to the [sic] Ukraine: ‘Look, why don’t 
you come and join the European Union … and NATO too’. This has been seen by Vladimir 
Putin as a deeply provocative act. I don’t want to be part of an emerging, expansionist EU 
foreign policy … I think it will be a danger to peace” (Farage 2014). 
 
Conclusion 
We have argued that debates over foreign affairs and Britain’s role in the world formed 
important component of the referendum debate in the UK during the run-up to the 2016 
Brexit vote. Drawing on campaign materials, we showed that distinct positions emerged 
within both the Remain and Leave camps, and we argued that these views were best 
understood as folk variants of liberal internationalism and realism, respectively, given 
the similarity of the issues at stake. The Remain campaign advanced a view of Britain’s 
role in the world that emphasised liberal internationalist themes, including the EU’s role 
in guaranteeing peace on the continent, the value and efficacy of international 
organisations, the benefits of the rules-based trading regime, the duties held by countries 
to those in other nations, and the benefits of expanding Western institutions and values. 
In contrast, the Leave campaign’s worldview was more realist, evidenced by its belief that 
American military power guaranteed European security, its concern at the sovereignty 
cost of European integration, its emphasis on the benefits of a flexible, neo-mercantilist 
trading policy, its worry at national resources being spent overseas and the risk of far-off 
entanglements, and its concern that Europeanisation had provoked conflict in Europe. 
Discussion of foreign affairs in the Brexit vote, we argued, was not only present, but also 
robust insofar as the same positions emerged time and again, and easily discernible on a 
number of common dimensions echoing pre-existing traditions of thought. 
Our findings have two implications for the study of British foreign policy. First, they 
suggest that the Brexit vote was about far more than Britain’s European connection; 
rather, much of the debate revolved around a conflict between two highly distinctive 
visions of Britain’s place in the international order – a realist one and a liberal one. This 
suggests not only that foreign affairs mattered in the campaign, but also that it is likely to 
matter more afterwards, given the victory of the Leave campaign and the ascendency of 
its views in British political discourse. Specifically, when contrasted with the rhetoric of 
the previous several decades of British foreign policymaking, our findings suggest that 
the UK’s place in the world after Brexit is becoming more politicised, with disagreement 
now more prominent in political discourse and party positions. The post-war consensus 
of the Cold War era, the internationalism of Tony Blair, and the liberal conservatism of 
the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition; all these saw British interests associated 
with liberal foreign policy prescriptions – soft power, institutionalisation, Western and 
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democratic alignments, and the promotion of human rights and good governance 
(Daddow 2015, 304). But the consensus on liberal foreign policy no longer commands 
across-the-board political support. While the policies listed in the government’s most 
recent manifesto and referenced in ministerial speeches (e.g. Davis 2018) continue to list 
broadly liberal ends for British foreign policy (support for a rules-based international 
order, the promotion of liberal norms and human rights abroad, and collective security 
against extra-European threats), the parallel rhetoric of Global Britain deployed by the 
same government – and championed by challengers inside and outside the Conservative 
party – is indicative of growing support for a more realist orientation. This may well 
create problems for future governments along similar lines to those entailed by the 
demise of the ‘permissive consensus’ on European integration which precipitated the 
Brexit vote (Hooghe & Marks 2009). That the UK will continue to pursue a liberal 
internationalist course after Brexit, albeit without the EU in its foreign policy toolbox, is 
not guaranteed. 
Second, the consistency of these international worldviews and their similarity to pre-
existing theories of international relations suggests IR as a discipline is perhaps more 
entangled with the real-world of foreign policy contestation than it would wish to admit. 
What are often viewed as ideologies from the perspective of those in the discipline often 
turn out, on closer inspection, to be remarkably similar to the ostensibly impartial tools 
scholars use to understand how the international domain “works”. Whilst this should not 
necessarily be unexpected – since realism and liberalism as traditions of international 
thought have been systematised out of pre-existing discourses – it does present a 
challenge to the widely-held view that these theories can offer objective and neutral 
analyses of international politics. If realism and liberalism can be identified as ideologies 
subject to domestic political contestation, they cannot possibly offer a neutral analytical 
perspective. Moreover, the overlap between theories and ideological positions suggests 
conceptual precision might be enhanced by the use of theoretical labels as signifiers 
rather than the use of alignments – Atlanticist, Europeanist, etc. – which are seemingly 
preferred by the majority of scholars. The divergence between realist and liberal 
ideological positions, we would argue, offers a more persuasive, and more detailed, 
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